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Abstract
After 1991, Ethiopia has introduced an ethnic federal governance system constituting nine regional states and two au-
tonomous city administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The restructuring of the state seemingly led to the decen-
tralisation of power to the regions and Woreda (district authority) levels local governance structure in 1995 and 2002
respectively. The purpose of this article is to examine the practices of decentralised local governance in Ethiopia in general
and the local governance performance at the level of peasant association (Kebele) in particular. The article also analyses
the link between the local governance and poverty based on three indicators: decentralisation and self-rule (DSR), local
capacity for planning (LCP), and effectiveness of local governance system (ELGS). Data was collected from eight selected
Kebeles of three different regional states through household survey, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions.
The study shows that while the power and control of the central government is well established, the Kebeles lack the
capacity and resources to deliver development. The LCP at Kebele level is weak because of organisational incapacity and
institutional constraints related to DSR. The ELGS is also poor since Kebeles do not have any fiscal rights and administrative
power for the reasons associated with DSR and LCP. The government has been implementing poverty reduction strategies
using productive safety net programmes and farmer training centres. These, however, have not had the desired outcome
due to organisational and institutional incapacitation of Kebele administrations.
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1. Introduction
In 1991, The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front (EPRDF) established an ethnic federal gov-
ernance system, which constitutes nine regional states
and two autonomous city administrations (Addis Ababa,
the capital of Ethiopia and Dire Dawa). Furthermore, the
government implemented a third restructuring of the
State in 1995 under the new Constitution, which is based
on the principle of ethnic federalism that divides power
between federal and ethnic-centred territorial Regional
States (RS). As a result, power has been shared with
the Regions that led to the emergence of a new power
structure at the centre and peripheries. The decentrali-
sation process was further extended toWoreda (district)
in 2002, based on the devolution of finance, human re-
sources and political power from regions to the fourth
tier of local governance structure at the Woreda level1.
1 Woreda is an Amharic term that refers to the next administrative tier after the regional level of government (similar to a district inmany other countries).
It is managed by an elected council of members and a strong executive that is derived from the council.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 1–15 1
The purpose of this article is to examine the practices
of decentralised local governance in Ethiopia in general
and the local governance performance at selected Peas-
ant Associations (PA) or Kebele, the lowest level local
administration2. It also elucidates the governance princi-
ples and practices based on primary empirical data gath-
ered through household survey, interviews and focus
group discussions. Primary data sources at the national
level include Government Institutions’White Papers sup-
plemented with key informant interviews.
The link between local governance and poverty is
analysed based on indicators developed for the pur-
pose, such as decentralisation and self-rule (DSR), lo-
cal capacity for planning (LCP), and effectiveness of lo-
cal governance system (ELGS). In order to attain this
objective, the article addresses the following research
questions: What are the emerging governing practices
in post-1991? Is poverty being adequately addressed
through decentralised local governance structures in
post-1991 Ethiopia?
The following section (i.e. Section two), discusses the
decentralised local governance framework of poverty
analysis which is developed based on review of relevant
literature. Section three explicates the methodology and
study context. Section four discusses an emergent post-
1991 local governance practice in Ethiopia based on re-
view of relevant literature and data from the field study.
Section five presents the local governance system and
institutional structure based on empirical data and rel-
evant literature reviews. Section six analyses the decen-
tralised local governance practice and poverty reduction
experience at Kebele level administration. A brief conclu-
sion, stitching together the main elements of the overall
argument is delineated in section seven.
2. Decentralised Local Governance: A Conceptual
Framework
Governance is an elusive term (Meuleman, 2008). In
academia, there are controversies about governance as a
concept. Some scholars consider governance as an ideo-
logical imposition against developing countries to recon-
struct the state structure in accordance with neo-liberal
orientation (Harrison, 2004). In fact, governance is differ-
ent fromgovernment in the sense that government is the
structure and function of public institutions, while gov-
ernance is the way government gets its job done in co-
operation with other stakeholders (Kettl, 2015). In other
words, it implies a process.
The term governance denotes different meanings for
different people. For some scholars, it refers to a mech-
anism of creating a newly ordered rule and collective ac-
tion (Stoker, 1998). For others, it implies a new pattern
of decision-making and platform for participation (Chho-
tray & Stoker, 2009). For others, it still signifies a new
technique and mode of governing practice (Dean, 2010;
Miller & Rose, 2008). Some consider it as the totality of
relations among actors in addressing societal problems
(Meuleman, 2008).
Decentralized and strong local governance system
is considered as a prerequisite for sustainable develop-
ment and poverty reduction. Decentralised local gover-
nance is a system of decision-making or a framework
for participatory resource and political management at
a subnational level of administration (Ali Khan, 2013).
It constitutes two major elements: decentralisation and
local governance. Local governance is a set of institu-
tions, actors, mechanisms and processes created by the
constitution through which local people articulate their
interest, negotiate their difference, exercise their right
andmake decisions (Shah, 2006). Whereas, decentralisa-
tion denotes the transfer of power from national to sub-
national structures of government, assigning resources
to local authorities through de-concentration, delega-
tion, or devolution. The decentralisation process consti-
tutes four major interrelated components, namely po-
litical, administrative, fiscal and economic (Boko, 2002;
Schneider, 2003).
Political decentralisation marks the transfer of polit-
ical power to the subnational echelon of administration.
The decentralisation of power gives autonomy to local
authorities to make independent planning and decisions
on important local matters (Schneider, 2003; Treisman,
2007). The fiscal decentralisation devolves resources to
local authorities to carry out their activities, and coor-
dinate and lead local economic development initiatives
(Boko, 2002; Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Schneider, 2003).
Economic decentralisation expedites liberalisation of the
economy by transferring public sector services to pri-
vate or voluntary associations, allowing the market to
take a leading role in resource generation and alloca-
tions. Moreover, most of the service provisions are priva-
tised; a significant degree of deregulation under market
(the private sector) system coordinates basic services in-
cluding health, education, water, electricity and others
(Schneider, 2003; Treisman, 2007). For the purpose of
this article we combined and adopted perspectives illus-
trated by both Shah (2006) and Ali Khan (2013). We de-
fine decentralized local governance as the institution, or
structures, which exercise self -rule right, participatory
planning process and delivering capacity of social service
at the local level to meet or satisfy the need of local peo-
ple. This definition captures the indicators we developed
in the framework of analysis in Figure 1.
In retrospect, in this framework of analysis, poverty
reduction efforts at localities require Decentralization
and self-rule right (DSR) rights. DSR consolidates Local Ca-
pacity for Planning (LCP), which is a pivotal instrument
in local economic development and mobilisation of re-
sources. The local actors in pursuit of their interests are
motivated to take part in local governance processes in
order to get access to and control over resources. The in-
2 Kebele is an Amharic word which means neighbourhood referring to the lowest grassroots administrative unit after the Woreda, recognized by both
federal and regional constitutions as lower echelon of local administration in both urban and rural areas.
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Decentralizaon and local self-rule
(DSR)
Local capacity for planning
(LCP)
Economic growth Parcipaon Accountability Service delivery
Eﬀecve local governance system
(ELGS)
Decreased income poverty Decreased relave deprivaon
Proverty reducon
Figure 1. Framework for decentralised governance. Source: Adapted and modified from Ali Khan (2013).
teraction of these actors prompts local economic devel-
opment, which is key in the reduction of income poverty
at localities as illustrated in Figure 1.
In addition to LCP, as depicted in Figure 1, DSR is
assigned the role of building an effective local gover-
nance system (ELGS), a vital instrument for addressing
poverty-reduction, relative deprivation and social exclu-
sion at localities. ELGS improves the service delivery ca-
pacity of local governance systems. Because the trans-
fer of power, resources, and responsibilities encourages
representation, accountability together with participa-
tion, inclusive development, and empowerment tomake
collective decisions based on local people’s interest. It
also motivates local entrepreneurial capacities in the
provision of improved service delivery. However, decen-
tralised governance is not always successful. At times it
may result in unexpected indirect consequences, particu-
larly in multi-ethnic societies. It is therefore, not heretic
to propose that, if a dominant ethnic group controls fi-
nancial, human resources, and political power, the subse-
quent struggle for resources may spark resource-based
ethnic conflicts.
3. Methodological Considerations
A mixed methodology research approach is adopted,
combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Pur-
posive sampling was employed to select multi-layered
study areas from region, zone, district, and Kebele; while,
systematic random sampling method was used to frame
sample size, select households and to draw their views
from local areas. Data was collected from three purpose-
fully selected regions, which represent different agro-
climatic zones, livelihood patterns, ethnicity, and histor-
ical traditions. Gamo highlands represents the ‘Enset’
(false banana)-based livelihood, highland agro-climatic
zone, minority ethnic group from southern Ethiopia.
Jimma represents the cash crop-based livelihood, mid
land agro-climatic zone, Muslim and majority Oromo
ethnic groups. Deberberhan area represents grain crop-
based livelihood, low and high land agro-climatic zones,
and majority Amhara ethnic group. Accordingly, the
quantitative datawas collected froma total of 518 house-
holds in eight rural Kebeles.
For data collection, we used both structured and
semi -structured questionnaires. Likert scale questions
were used for the survey, and a series of interviews and
focus group discussions were held with key informants
of the study and local peasants. The respondents for the
questionnaire survey were farmer households who were
randomly chosen from the selected Kebeles. The key in-
formants included Kebele administrators, development
agents, peasants, and scholars who are informed of the
setting. The socio-economic background of the respon-
dents of the household survey are given in Table 1.
Table 1 depicts that the majority of respondents
are male (93.2%, N = 483), and their main occupation
(livelihood) is agriculture (92.5%, n = 479). In terms
of education, most of the respondents are primary
school dropouts (45.8%, n = 237) and others are illit-
erate (42.9%, N = 222). About a third (29.6%, n = 154)
of the households earn a monthly income below 300
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Table 1. Socio-economic background of respondents (N = 518). Source: Survey data (2011/2012).
Background Category N %
Occupation Farmer 479 92.5
Others 39 7.5
Education Illiterate 222 42.9
Primary 237 45.8
Secondary and above 59 11.3
Gender Male 483 93.2
Female 35 6.8
Household income (in ETB) < 100 ETB 118 22.8
101–300 154 29.7
301–500 124 23.9
> 500 ETB 122 22.6
Total N = 518 100%
Ethiopian Birr (USD 15.8). Nearly 80% of the respondents
described their income as less than USD 30 (which is be-
low the USD 1.25 per day poverty line).
4. Post-1991 Local Governance Practice in Ethiopia
The ethnic federal system that was established in post-
1991 Ethiopia constitutes nine regional states and two
autonomous administrative cities. The decentralized
power of the state is divided between the Federal andNa-
tional Regional States in conformitywith the 1995 Consti-
tution. Each region has been awarded a quasi-sovereign
status and self-rule authority, enshrined in separate au-
tonomous Constitutions. Regions have also assumed the
power and right to prepare their own socio-economic de-
velopment plan, to mobilise resources and to allocate
and utilise regional budgets. Both federal and regional
constitutions have ensured authority for self-rule and
share-rule at all levels of administration (Abbink, 1997;
Fiseha, 2006).
Articles 50 and 51 of the 1995 Constitution enlist
the powers and responsibilities of both Federal and Re-
gional states. The decentralisation of power from cen-
tre to regions is carried out in terms of ethnic repre-
sentations, ethnic geography and historical role of eth-
nic groups. The system developed is akin to neopatri-
monialism but has a character of consensual democracy
(Chanie, 2007; Mengisteab, 2008). The decentralisation
has created a different locus of power in the regions by in-
corporating emerging ethno-elites. It has also introduced
a kind of participatory and accommodative governance
structure both in the region and at the centre (Fiseha,
2006). Apart from political and economic decentralisa-
tion, an emerging new governing practice of the post-
1991 period manifests multiculturalism, developmental-
ism, socio-cybernetics and statistical-based governance
as major characteristics of governance.
Multiculturalism is thewidely applied governance ap-
proach in the post-1991 period. It is used as a means
of engendering legitimacy and constructing governable
subjects under a plea for ethnic equalities. It is ratio-
nalised on the tenet of national operation and implies
that the fundamental problem of the Ethiopian state
emanates from ‘unequal ethnic relations’. The rationale
further asserts that political engineering under broader
framework of ‘Andet Ethiopia’ (a unitary State or one
Ethiopia), adhering to the Pan-Ethiopia project, did not
succeed because of assimilation policy by previous gov-
ernments. The core governance problemwas articulated
as a lack of political settlement and an inclusive gov-
ernance structure to accommodate the competing in-
terests of ethnic groups. Therefore, promotion of cul-
tural pluralism in the new multiculturalist governance is
seen as an indispensable means to avoid ethnic rifts and
to emancipate the masses from abject poverty (Fiseha,
2006; Turton, 2006).
The ethnic federalism can be viewed as a pioneering
effort similar to Haile Selassie’s modernisation endeav-
our of the mid-1900s. Many scholars argue that the ap-
proach is not optimal. Nevertheless, it has brought signif-
icant dynamics to the political, economic and social set-
tings of the country. Politically, revolutionary democracy
and ethnic federalism have emerged as leading agencies;
economically, a free market economy with a bigger role
for the state has been introduced, and socially, cultural
pluralism, with Amharic notion of ‘BehereBehereseboch’
that refers to nation and nationality, became a catch-
phrase of daily life and a powerful discursive narrative
of political mobilisation.
Multiculturalism prompts the rise of ethno-elites in
the regions with strong sentiments of ethnic identity (Ab-
bink, 2009). The central government has crafted a con-
trolling mechanism against these ‘unruly’ elites, based
on the principle of democratic centralisation. However,
the growing patronage practice has been posing a threat
to democratic transition and consolidation. The ethnic
politics prompts recruitment to political offices and ac-
cess to jobs to be along ethnic lines. To this end, the ris-
ing ethno elites have organised a complex informal net-
work both in their respective regions and national gov-
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ernment to control, survive and dominate the politics
(Abbink, 2009; Chanie, 2007).
Developmentalism is another governing approach
that has emerged since 2001 following the split in lead-
ership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and
intensified by the election crisis of 2005. The govern-
ment has apparently been articulating that achieving an
accelerated development was indispensable for the sur-
vival of the nation (Gebresenbet, 2014). Consequently,
it claims a dominantly leading role in both the econ-
omy and politics. It has been justifying the rationale
to do so grounded on narratives of poverty reduction
and sustainable development. The trend ushers in a new
economic and political governance approach with the
main objective of mainstreaming national politics. For
example, the controversial large-scale agricultural invest-
ments which some scholars and rights groups identified
as ‘land grabbing’ has been introduced (Lavers, 2012;
Makki & Geisler, 2011). The new large-scale agricultural
investment projects dispossess properties, particularly
land from smallholding farmers and the urban poor who
are considered unproductive. Land is subsequently trans-
ferred to an emerging national private sector and inter-
national investors.
Access to land has given way for a new rising ethno-
elite class. Hence, families and close allies of these rising
ethno-elites have accumulated enormous wealth from
a heavily regulated land market supervised and oper-
ated by Federal and Regional governments (Lavers, 2012;
Makki & Geisler, 2011; Pausewang, 2004). They have
emerged as politically and economically powerful family
elites with strong bases in the regions. The trend marks
the new economic governance features that emerged
from the reconfiguration of political structures and con-
solidation of ethno-elite powers.
Socio-cybernetics is another emerging governance
instrument, widely applied in the post-1991 period. It
refers to communication and controlling methods in the
governing process that rely on information processing ca-
pacities (Pierre & Peters, 2000). One of the remarkable
features of this period is the massive capacity for steer-
ing, which is supported by the application of information
and communications technology (ICT). The government
has introduced and expanded ICT into districts and re-
mote rural areas through the so-called WAN (wide area
network) and various nets such as School-Net, Woreda-
Net, Agri-Net, HER-Net, Revenue-Net and Health-Net
programmes (Lessa, Belachew, & Anteneh, 2011).
The new ICT-driven governance has increased the
penetration and information-gathering capacity of the
state by penetrating into remote rural areas. The massive
broadband internet connection installations, the expan-
sion of community radio, improvement of telecommuni-
cation (free-call service, teleconferencing and othermeth-
ods, particularlymobile phones) all over the country have,
therefore, significantly improved the controlling and com-
munication capacity of the state (Belachew, 2010).
Apart from ICT, the government has created a com-
plex and sophisticated network of political control of all
rural households, which is nicknamed ‘one to five’. It has
created a multiple but hierarchical layer of organisation
that encompasses the various segments of the society in-
cluding the youth and women. These networks comprise
the popular wing, ‘Hezibawi Kenefe’, together with the
government wing, ‘Mengestawi Kenefe’, and the political
wing, ‘Derjitawi Kenefe’. The Government has assigned
each household to at least one of these organisational
structures. It has also devised a mechanism to tie one to
the other and to intertwine all of them together under
one locus of control. These complex threads of organ-
isations and networking give the government absolute
social and political control over the respective localities
(Snyder et al., 2014).
Likewise, the incorporation of peasants into a com-
plex web of political control, one to five and other net-
working, is also used as a means of infusing ideology.
The farmers have been ensnared by the reigning ideology
of the government. The ideology is inculcated through
a series of meetings, indoctrination and in public dis-
cussions. Peasants also receive formal ideological train-
ing through farmer training centres (FTCs). Therefore,
the government is rather successful in turning peasants
into subjects. In all study areas, the majority of farmers
seemed to be strong supporters of the government and
displayed a rather uniform character and thinking, re-
gardless of geographic and other considerations. The op-
erations of modern government, according to Miller and
Rose (2008), advance through the accumulation and tab-
ulation of facts about the governed subjects. Hence, the
government employs organised statistical techniques to
calculate tax returns, adopt social reforms and com-
pute the gross national product, growth rates of differ-
ent economies, rates of inflation and the money supply.
From these calculations and tabulations emerge written
reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts and graphs,
for use as a means of governing citizens.
In post-1991 Ethiopia, the government has inten-
sified the application of advanced statistical methods
to analyse and depict the economic, social and politi-
cal status of the country. It also consolidated and ex-
panded the capacity of the Central Statistical Author-
ity (CSA)—a government agency responsible for collect-
ing and disseminating statistical data. This agency gen-
erates statistical data of various development indicators
under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Develop-
ment (MoFED). According to a scholar we interviewed,
‘EPRDF employed statistical techniques to convince first
single-digit and then double-digit economic growth and
miracles of economic growth since the mid-2000s to
the people at large and the international community,
in particular’3. The statistics-based governance applica-
tions have greatly helped the government to disclose its
performance and engender legitimacy as developmental
state. In the next section, we briefly discuss the evolu-
3 Interview with a scholar in February 2012, Addis Ababa.
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tion of local governance institutions, the practice of de-
centralized local governance in post-1991 and the perfor-
mance of selected local governance institutions based on
three indicators (DSR, LCP and ELGS).
5. Local Governance and Local Institutions in Post-1991
Ethiopia
The local governance system constitutes integrated in-
stitutions of production and governance that surround
and connect local communities. It incorporates differ-
ent kinds of social, economic and political organizations
and functions. Some notable examples of local level
governance systems are community resource mobiliza-
tion orders, social engagement and reciprocity instru-
ments, security arrangements, asset management, con-
flict resolution mechanisms, infrastructure and sector
services development apparatus (Bardhan, 1991; Saito,
2008). In Ethiopia’s case, local governance is organised
under Kebeles.
5.1. The Local Governance Structure: A Historical
Perspective
Historically, the local administration institutions were
evolved during the reign of Menlik II (1886–1913), as
garrison towns known as ‘Ketamas’ or district towns. Be-
cause of the limited penetration capacity, the state could
not establish local administration at all rural localities. It
was operating from garrison towns. During the reign of
Haile Selassie, the local governance restructuring was ini-
tiated under 1944 and 1966 proclamations, but could not
establish administrative units in the local realm (Ayele,
2011; Zewde & Pausewang, 2002). The state, using the
district towns as a springboard, had been transferring in-
vestible surplus of product from the rural areas through
tax, compulsory contribution and other mechanisms. No
meaningful public investments were made in rural areas.
The ‘Derg’ or the military regime had established
the grassroots local governance structures (Kebeles) un-
der proclamations 31 and 71 of 1975 (Engdawork, 1995;
Mammo, 1999). The role of the Kebeles was limited to
land redistribution, local policing and coordinating social
services. They were not given or allowed any mandate
to plan and execute local development activities. In fact,
the creation of the local administration structure had re-
duced routine local governance service provision.
Like its predecessor, the ‘Derg’ Government did not
make significant public investments in the rural sector.
Rather, it forced the rural people to become organised
under cooperative groups, which were modelled after
the former Soviet Union and imposed a compulsory grain
quota delivery. The grain quota delivery system was
aimed at ensuring sustainable and cheap supply of ba-
sic food commodities to the growing numbers of urban
people, to quell any possible political opposition from
the critical urban mass. The rural Kebeles have there-
fore been used as means for appropriating surplus prod-
uct and transferring surplus to urban areas where the
government sought to establish a political base (Abegaz,
2004; Pausewang, 2004). Eventually, political engineer-
ing brought neither economic development nor agrarian
transformation to rural areas.
In sum, in post-1991 Ethiopia, the EPRDF has contin-
ued to use the Kebele as local structure without mak-
ing any significant structural changes. The legal structure
of the local governance was based on Article 39(3) and
50(4) of the 1995 Ethiopian Federal Democratic Repub-
lic (EFDR) constitution. The local authorities (Kebeles)
have not been assigned any specific powers, except the
Woreda or district authorities, which are authorised to
initiate, plan and execute development activities. Hence,
the power of the local authority is confined to the deliv-
ery of basic services as before (Assefe&Gebre-Egziabher,
2007; Ayele, 2011).
5.2. The Local Governing System and Leadership
The administration structure of the current Kebele insti-
tutions comprises of an elected council of 100 members
known as ‘Yemeto Shengo’, an executive committee of
five to seven members ‘Kebele Cabinet’, a social court
known as ‘Frede Shengo’ and a local militia force which
is known as ‘Tataeki’. A diagrammatic representation of
the institutional structure of Kebele is given in Figure 2
below.
Local Council
(Yemeto Shengo)
Kebele Manager
Sector coordinaon (schools,
health centre and development
assistance (DA))
Kebele Chairperson
Social court
Local security
(Tataeki)
Figure 2. The institutional structure of Kebele. Source: Sketched by the authors based on the information from local
authorities.
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The main responsibilities of the Kebele council and
executive committee are endorsing the development
plan, which is prepared by and directed from Woreda
authorities, ensuring the collection of land and agricul-
tural income tax, organising local labour and in-kind con-
tributions to development initiatives, and mitigating lo-
cal conflicts within the jurisdiction of local community so-
cial courts. Kebeles also steer the delivery of basic social
services such as education and health in their respective
localities in consultation with the Woreda and coordina-
tors of the services at Kebele level such as school and
health centre heads (Snyder et al., 2014).
Regarding local leadership, Kebele authorities are led
by an executive body of five to seven cabinetmembers in-
cluding chairman, three council members, a Kebele man-
ager assigned by a Woreda, development agent, health
extension officer and school director. The manager, who
is reasonably educated, salaried and appointed by a
Woreda, recently emerged as the most influential actor
in the local affairs. In addition to the Kebele manager, de-
velopment agents also play an important role in issues re-
lated to agricultural production and coordinating farmer
training centres (FTCs) (Lefort, 2010).
5.3. Decentralisation and Local Governance
Performance in Post-1991 Ethiopia
Decentralisation of power to sub-national administration
is considered as an essential instrument for augment-
ing local economic development. It promotes empower-
ment to encourage different actors (state and non-state)
to take part in coordinated development activities of lo-
calities (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Saito, 2008). It
also helps to enhance service delivery and inclusive de-
velopment. According toGrindle (2007), decentralisation
may not necessarily result in faster, inclusive and sustain-
able development. We identify three major indicators:
DSR, LCP and ELGS as indicators to measure local gover-
nance performance at Kebele level.
5.3.1. Decentralisation and Self-Rule (DSR)
The EPRDF-led government has applied decentralisation
as a key means of political settlement and engendering
legitimacy. The decentralisation process was undertaken
in two phases: to the regions in 1995 and to theWoredas
in 2002 (Assefa & Gebre-Egziabher, 2007). The decen-
tralisation of power to the regions primarily gave self-
governance right but has also substantially furthered the
shared-rule right to fair and equitable representation in
the federal state (Abbink, 1997; Turton, 2006).
The first phase of decentralisation was implemented
between 1991 and 2001. It was aimed at creating and
consolidating regional national government’s capacity
for self-rule and was designated as mid-level decentral-
isation. The legality of the decentralisation process was
stipulated in the transitional charter (1991) and the Fed-
eral Constitution (1995). In this phase of decentralisation,
political, fiscal and administrative powers were trans-
ferred to the regional states. National regional govern-
ments have been entrusted with all legislative, executive
and judicial powers in respect of all matters within their
jurisdiction, except those that fell under the federal–
state domain such as defence, foreign affairs, and eco-
nomic policy (Assefe & Gebre-Egziabher, 2007).
The second phase of decentralisation, involving dis-
trict level decentralisation programmes (DLDP) and urban
management programmes, took place in 2002. This phase
resulted in the restructuring of institutions at Woreda
level administrations, together with devolution of politi-
cal and fiscal power from regions to Woredas. DLDP de-
volved a considerable portion of human and financial re-
sources in the form of a block grant to Woreda by rolling
down power and resources from zones (the third tier
of administration above Woreda) to Woreda level. The
Woredas were also given autonomous right to plan and
implement development activities within the bounds of
resources available to them (Snyder et al., 2014).
Rural Kebeles have not experienced any signifi-
cant change in its nature nor in its structural dimen-
sion. Though the government claims that implementing
agriculture-led industrialisation will place the rural peo-
ple at the centre of the policy locus, there is no elaborate
institutional framework, which is capable of transform-
ing the fragmented smallholding agriculture and the sub-
sistence livelihood of the rural people at grassroots level.
The decentralisation process floated in the regional and
to some extent at Woreda levels. As one local official of
the rural Kebele of Jimma area noted:
“We have neither full power to make decision on our
local matters nor resources to stimulate local based
development activities.We simplywait for order from
Woreda officials. If the government devolves the full
power to make decisions based on our people’s inter-
est and even to collect or develop limited resources in
order to speed up local development, we can make a
big difference. Lack of power has really constrained us
not to fully commit to community development. Take
a watershed management programme. It is a good ex-
ample. It is quite essential for local people but most
local people are against it. They do not feel a sense of
ownership.”4
As noted by this local official, Kebeles have neither fiscal
power with relevant resources nor are they allowed to
generate local finances. The mandates of tax and other
collections are given to the Woreda authorities. The Ke-
bele officials are not allowed to engage in any finance-
related matters (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008). This has im-
plications for the effective functioning of the local insti-
tutions. The powerlessness of Kebele was reinforced in
the view of local farmers in the Azo and Dorze areas of
the Gamo highlands. They preferred the manager to the
4 Interview with local official in February 2013, Jimma area.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 1–15 7
Kebele chair. As one farmer in Azo Gule noted:
“The Kebele leaders do not have the real power to
make decisions. The political power is vested on the
Woreda leaders. Therefore, they are simply carrying
out orders given from the Woreda. The Woreda pro-
pose, develop and simply request the local people
to approve their decision. What we do is simply ap-
proving their decision through the council and Kebele
administration.”5
During the household survey, the respondents were
asked about their opinion on decentralised governance.
Table 2 presents the findings of the household survey
about decentralisation of power and resources at Kebele
level.
As depicted in Table 2 below, regarding decentralisa-
tion and local self-rule in the respective local communi-
ties, the respondent view indicates that 19.3% (N = 100)
disagreed and 36.7 (N = 190) were undecided about
the questions. The mean value is 3.03. The majority
of the local people seem not to agree with decentral-
isation of power and self-rule practices in their local
arena. The result of the survey is also consistent with
what we observed in the field. The Kebeles lack sub-
stantive power and they are under the shadow of the
district (Woreda) administrations. They do not exercise
autonomous political, fiscal and administrative respon-
sibilities, although they do exercise limited administra-
tive prerogatives. They are, nevertheless, under strict
Woreda dominance.
5.3.2. Local Capacity for Planning (LCP)
LCP is one of themajor aspects of decentralised local gov-
ernance processes. It refers to the institutional and pol-
icy capacity of local actors in performing their respective
responsibilities. The policy capacity refers to the ability
of local actors to contextualise the policy direction and
allocate scarce resources to implement policy (Painter &
Pierre, 2005). Local institutional capacity denotes spec-
ified rules, procedures, and norms that govern interac-
tions of local institutions by delineating their role and
responsibilities with adequate conflict mitigation mech-
anisms (Peters & Pierre, 1998). Hope (2008, p. 152) de-
scribes institutional capacity as ‘the competency of indi-
viduals, public sector institutions, private sector entities,
civil society organisations, and local communities to en-
gage in activities in a sustainable manner that permit the
achievement of beneficial goals’.
LCP gives local people the opportunity to develop
a feasible development plan responding to the prevail-
ing local social problems and available resources. It en-
hances local people’s capacity to efficiently utilise avail-
able resources by prioritising their pressing social prob-
lems according to the available resources. Moreover, it
helps to synergise the local plan with national, indige-
nous knowledge, cultural context and agro-ecology set-
tings of the society. Furthermore, it also gave a sense of
ownership and an opportunity to the local people to de-
cide on their own matters (Saito, 2008).
Articles 39(3) and 50(4) of the Federal and Regional
Constitutions of Ethiopia confer power on local author-
ities to make a local development plan and coordinate
development initiatives. Although the power to prepare
development plan is given to the Kebele authorities, they
do not fully exercise this power. In fact, they provide in-
put for an annual development plan which is prepared
by Woreda authorities (Snyder et al., 2014). This trend
affects the LCP and institutional capacity of the local
authorities to coordinate development efforts. Table 3
presents the household survey results concerning local
capacity for planning in selected Kebeles. A farmer in
Goshe Bado Deberberhan area stated:
“Comparing to the Derg regime, the current Kebele
administration is better. The chairperson and other
committee members were more accessible to the lo-
cal people. They listen to the people. However, they
had had a big problem regarding planning and coordi-
nating activities. The problem is attributed to skill gap
and lack of power. They do not have sufficient capac-
ity so that the Woreda officials did the planning task.
Go and ask our officials who has prepared this year lo-
cal plan? They would tell you the Woreda did that.”6
The farmer’s remark echoed in a similar conversation
with local officials. Snyder and others who researched
on local planning practice (see Snyder et al., 2014) found
that Kebeles were involved in the initial planning process
5 Interview with local farmer in Azo Gule in January 2012, Gamo highland.
6 Interview with local farmer in Goshebado in December 2013.
Table 2. Response to the statement ‘local governance is decentralised and all-inclusive’. Source: Survey data (2011/2012).
Indicators Household ratings (%)
Mean SD DK SD DA UD AG SA Total
Local authorities are 3.03 1.17 30(5.8) 10(1.9) 100(19.3) 190(36.7) 152(29.3) 36(6.9) 518(100)
decentralised and
all inclusive
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
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(giving input) but Woreda authorities made the final de-
cision regarding the plan. The respondents’ views regard-
ing Kebele’s capacity to make and implement local plans
are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 reveals that the majority of respondents
(around 32.4%, N = 168) were undecided and a signif-
icant number of respondents (32.2%, N = 167) do not
believe in local authorities independent capacity to plan
and implement. Poor organisational capacity in terms of
physical facilities, human and financial resources were
also observed during field visits. Although the population
and territorial size of the Kebeles have been changed; nei-
ther new institutional innovations nor improved organi-
sational structures have developed to accommodate the
dynamism. Hence, the Kebeles’ local capacity to make
plans remains limited. The findings of the survey also con-
firm this fact.
5.3.3. Effective Local Governance System (ELGS)
An ELGS comprises local institutional capacity for service
delivery, accountability and responsiveness of local au-
thorities, and participation and inclusion of the local peo-
ple in the local governance system. All these dimensions
of ELGS indicate the level and scope of local governance
effectiveness and efficiency under decentralised gover-
nance notions. Effective service delivery to the poor is
an integral aspect of poverty reduction efforts (Bonfigli-
oli, 2003; Grindle, 2007). The basic social services allow
poor people to be productive members of the society.
Therefore, the provision of services including education,
health, family planning, road, electricity, water, agricul-
tural support and security are essential in poverty reduc-
tion effort.
Ideally, accountability and responsiveness allow the
local people to call officials and to hold them account-
able to their performance. It is also an effective means
to control corruption and embezzlement of meagre re-
sources at localities (Rao & Berg, 2005). Participation
and empowerment in the local governance practice is
another major aspect of local governance effectiveness
(Bonfiglioli, 2003). As Alsop (2004) and Green (2012)
note, poverty, power and right are inexorably intercon-
nected. According to Alsop (2004, p. 4), political empow-
erment that marks ‘increasing the capacity of individu-
als and groups to make choices and to transform these
choices into desired actions and outcomes’ has had a sig-
nificant impact on transforming the dependent poor into
productive citizens.
Though the rural Kebeles represent the wider and
larger segment of the society (83% of the Ethiopian pop-
ulation), they exercise very limited administrative power
which is delegated byWoreda authorities. Their account-
ability is upward and not to the local people (Ayele,
2011). Their ability to deliver adequate and fast local
services is severely constrained by resource problems.
As one farmer noted in focus group discussion in Dawa,
Jimma area: “The Kebele authorities try to give us a swift
response tomost of our questions at their best. However,
because of resource problems, we were not getting ade-
quate services”7.
As we witnessed in the fieldwork, most of Kebele ad-
ministration runs with a shortage of resources. They did
not even have a well-organised archive and record sys-
tem, let alone necessary services. It is very difficult to get
basic information about the Kebele.
Regarding participation, the current Kebele struc-
tures were much appreciated by local people in most of
the study areas. Most of the farmers interviewed were
involved in Kebele activities in one way or another.
Table 4 presents the views of local people from the
study areas about local governance effectiveness in their
respective localities.
The first statement addressed local service delivery.
As we can see from the result, the overwhelming ma-
jority of respondents (mean value 3.46, supposing 4
amounted to agreement) were not satisfied and 38.6
per cent (N = 200) agreed with statement, 12% (N = 62)
strongly agreed and 33.8% (N = 177) were ‘undecided’.
The second statement was ‘the local governance system
is all-inclusive and participatory’. The overall mean value
obtained from the respondents on this was 3.45. This
means most of the respondents seemed to agree that
the existing local system is participatory and all-inclusive.
Accordingly, 42.9% (N = 222) and 10.2% (N = 52) of
the respondents ‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ with the
statement respectively. The third statement was about
accountability of local authority to local people. Again,
7 Focus group discussion in February 2013, Dawa, Jimma area.
Table 3. Response to the statement ‘local authority has the capacity to make and implement local plan’. Source: Survey
data (2011/2012).
Indicators Household ratings (%)
Mean SD DK SD DA UD AG SA Total
Local authorities have 2.97 1.02 3(0.6) 18(3.5) 168(32.4) 167(32.2) 125(24.1) 37(7.1) 518(100)
independent capacity to
make local development
plan and implement them
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
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Table 4. Response to the statements regarding local government effectiveness (service delivery, accountability, participa-
tion). Source: Survey data (2011/2012).
Indicators Household ratings (%)
Mean SD DK SD DA UD AG SA Total
Local service delivery 3.46 0.93 2(0.2) 3 (0.6) 76(14.5) 177(33.8) 200(38.6) 62(12) 518(100)
is not adequate
The local governance is 3.45 0.97 9(1.7) 6(1.2) 55(10.6) 174(33.6) 222(42.9) 52(10) 518(100)
inclusive and participatory
Local authorities are 3.83 0.86 0 3(0.6) 22(4.2) 158(30.5) 213(41.1) 122(23.6) 518(100)
accountable to
the local people
Notes: DK= don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
as evident in the results, the overwhelming majority
of respondents believed that local officials are account-
able to the local people. The mean value is 3.83 (almost
agreement) and 41.1% (N = 213) and 23.6% (N = 122)
‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ to the question respec-
tively. However, as we witnessed in the field work and
evidences gathered during key informant interviews, the
accountability of the Kebele authorities is upward to the
Woreda level administration.
6. The Practice of Decentralised Governance and
Poverty Reduction at Kebele Localities
Participatory decentralised local governance is generally
better informed about the needs and preference of lo-
cal community than central government, which has lim-
ited opportunities to access the reality from a distance.
In decentralised governance, monitoring and controlling
of local agents is easier (Bonfiglioli, 2003). Local people
hold the elected officials accountable, and poor people
get the opportunity to voice their interest in the polit-
ical decision-making process. Moreover, the devolution
of power gives more responsibility, ownership and incen-
tives to the local people (Green, 2012; Saito, 2008).
The effectiveness of decentralised governance de-
pends on the institutional capacity of local authorities
and policy implementation capacity (poverty reduction
strategies) by the state. Likewise, poverty needs to be
addressed through effective policy instruments that are
supported by workable institutions at all level of admin-
istration (Treisman, 2007). Institutional capacity has sev-
eral dimensions such as human capital, infrastructure
(physical capital) and capacity to deliver services. Institu-
tional capacity is critical in implementing decentralised
governance. Poor quality of institutions may cause re-
source embezzlement, delay or denial of service delivery
to the local people, and in the worst case, sluggish local
economic performance. Institutions, therefore, are quite
essential to fight against poverty (Painter & Pierre, 2005;
Treisman, 2007).
The policy capacity (for developing poverty reduc-
tion strategies) is another major factor in decentralised
governance. It guides the process of decentralised gov-
ernance towards mitigating poverty challenges. As de-
centralised governance transfers power and resources to
lower echelons of administration, it allows participation,
fair resource distribution, empowerment and responsive-
ness. Decentralised governance thus creates a conducive
ground for policy implementation (Painter & Pierre, 2005).
As we noted earlier, the decentralisation of power
to local governance institutions drifted at Woreda level
administration. Although the majority of the people live
in rural localities, decentralisation of power and devolu-
tion of resources has not extended to the grassroots ad-
ministration (Zewde & Pausewang, 2002). The poverty
reduction efforts coordinated from Woredas have been
implemented through three major approaches, namely
enhancing agricultural productivity through improved
technology, developing resilience to vulnerability and
food insecurity through a Productive Safety Net Pro-
gramme (PSNP) which aims to build assets and liveli-
hoods of vulnerable households, and resettling farmers
fromdrought-prone areas into fertile but less inhabitable
locations in selected lowland areas of the country. For ex-
ample, Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Bu-
reau (WORAD) coordinates the PSNP. The main responsi-
bility of governing the PSNP is vested in specifically estab-
lished Woreda Food Security Task Forces (WFSTFs). Fig-
ure 3 below describes the implementation of the PSNP at
Kebele level administration. The Woreda task force coor-
dinated byWORAD consists ofWFSTFs, theWoreda Food
Security Desk (WFSD) and the Woreda Office of Finance
and Economic Development (WOFED).
At the Kebele level, the FSTF comprises of the se-
lected council members, the chair of the Kebele, devel-
opment agents and the Kebele manager. The role of the
Kebele in the implementation of PSNP is limited to the
selection of eligible households to the programme, col-
lecting complaints from the beneficiaries and organising
public meetings for the Woreda officials. Woreda, how-
ever, carries out the overall programme. Even the deci-
sion whether the household is to remain part of the pro-
gramme or not is made byWoreda. Figure 3 presents the
governing process of PSNP.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 1–15 10
Woreda Council
Regional State Board
FSCO
Household/Community
WoredaFSTF
• Resolve any major problems or issues arising
• out of the selecon process.
• Undertake spot checks on Kebeles
• Submit the list of parcipants to the Woreda
• Council for ﬁnal approval.
• Review, compile and approve Kebele
• parcipant lists
• Compare planning ﬁgures from the region
• to the actual requested number of
• parcipants from the Kebeles, and take
• appropriate acon.
• Propose allocaon of parcipant numbers
• for each PA or Kebele.
• Set local criteria for beneﬁciary selecon.
KebeleFSTF
• Collect and compile parcipant lists from
• the diﬀerent villages (including PW/DS
• allocaon) and submit these to the WFSTF
• for veriﬁcaon, consent, and/or adjustment.
• Familiarize the CFSTF with beneﬁciary
• selecon procedures.
Kebele Council
Figure 3. PSNP governance framework at Kebele level. Source: Sketched by the authors.
Taking this figure into consideration, the role of the
Kebele in poverty reduction is trivial. Most of the Kebele
administrations could not provide accurate information
about the magnitude and depth of poverty in their local-
ities. They do not have information systems about basic
data on demography or economic matters (such as land
size, productivity, income, non-farm income, type of crop
production), agro-ecology, vulnerability, types and level
of technology, social service provision, or rural infras-
tructure coverage (electricity, road, telephone, water).
In the areas where this research was conducted—Azo
Gule, Chano Mile, Amaraena Bodo, Gerema, Merewa,
Alyu Amba, and Goshe Bado—the researchers witnessed
this fact. However, it should be noted that Alyu Amba,
Chano Mile and Goshe Bado were relatively in a better
condition compared to others as they did store some ba-
sic information about the area.
Another poverty mitigation mechanism at Kebele
level is FTC. The FTC is considered a cornerstone to sup-
port small-scale agriculture in rural Ethiopia, and was in-
troduced in 2002 in each rural Kebele. Three develop-
ment agents are assigned to each FTC. They are trained
in crop science, livestock, and natural resource man-
agement. There are nearly 8,500 such centres through-
out the country. The government’s plan is to establish
about 15,000 centres in the near future. About seven to
ten committee members including development agents
and selected model farmers manage the centre. The Ke-
bele Chairperson is in charge of coordinating the FTC.
The Committee’s responsibility includes planning, exam-
ining the training and demonstration activities offered
by the FTC. It also organises and maintains a demonstra-
tion field. The FTC provides training and technical assis-
tance in the application of improved technology, produc-
tion systems, market-orientated information, seed and
seedlings of new crops, vegetables, fruit and forage va-
rieties. FTC is part of the initiative to modernise and im-
prove the agricultural system production in each Kebele.
FTC and PSNP are the two institutional (infrastruc-
tural) settings to address poverty at Kebele level. FTC
aims to reduce poverty through intensification and di-
versification of agricultural products. It also provides as-
sistance on market-related information and non-farm
work opportunities to diversify the income of the farm-
ers. The PSNP is the social protection programme for
ensuring food security for vulnerable and food-insecure
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poor households through direct assistance (cash or food)
and food-for-work arrangements. The implementation
of both modalities have been limited by lack of fiscal and
political power in Kebele administration.
The role of the Kebele in the PSNP is to identify and
select beneficiaries for the Woreda authorities. Kebeles
did not assume power and necessary resources to imple-
ment both PSNP and FTC initiatives because the govern-
ment has not been providing substantial public invest-
ment in rural Kebeles. It seems to adhere to the same
policy as the Derg governments. Therefore, lack of incre-
mental rural public investment has remained the major
challenge in tackling rural poverty. The resource trans-
fers from rural areas to the centre have consolidated the
power structure of the state, but prevent trickle-down
to the poor, reinforcing dependency and systematically
perpetuating poverty.
Some scholars criticise the poverty reduction scheme
as top-down in that it conceives of the poor as subjects
ultimately dependent on the state for their well-being.
This understanding of the poor as subject involves a pol-
icy implication and consequence. Rather than ensuring
the well-being of citizens, the government seems to be
concerned with guaranteeing its own survival by amass-
ing support from the poor subjects. Poverty reduction
efforts are political in that poor households are allowed
support on condition that they fully support the regime.
For instance, in the case of the PSNP, poor households
are identified and selected by WFSTF at Kebeles chaired
by the Kebele chairperson. In most cases, the Kebele au-
thority handpicks farmers who are loyal to the regime as
a reward.
In our study, we also asked the peasants whether the
PSNP was politically tied. The following tables present
the results.
Tables 5 and 6 portray that majority of the respon-
dents tend to believe that the PSNP is tied to political mo-
tives. A total of 24.7% (N = 128) of the respondents were
‘undecided’ on the issue while 28.1% (N = 149) and 7.5%
(N = 39) of respondents ‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ re-
spectively. Majority of the respondents in Dawa (37.7%,
N = 26; 31%,N = 22) agreed and strongly agreed respec-
tively and in Azo Gule Kebele (52.9%, N = 37; 14.3%,
N = 10) ‘agreed’, and ‘strongly agreed’, respectively that
the PSNP is tied to political motives.
The goal of the state, therefore, appears to be con-
solidating its control over the society rather than reduc-
ing poverty. Consequently, poor people get less consid-
eration for empowerment and participation. Moreover,
the practice maintains a dependency syndrome on aid
among awide spectrum of rural people who believe they
are eligible for aid in response to their loyalty and sup-
port of the government (Dercon, Gilligan, Hoddinott, &
Woldehanna, 2009).
7. Conclusion
In post-1991 Ethiopia, an ethnic federal governance sys-
tem was established, comprising Regional Governments
and a Federal State, apportioning the state power be-
tween the two according to the 1995 Constitution, which
is based on ethnic geography and identity. Each Region
has been accorded a quasi-sovereign status and has
awarded a self-rule right with the autonomy to have sep-
arate regional constitutions. In addition to an ethnic fed-
eral governance system, the state introduced decentrali-
sation of power to local governance structure in 2002. Ac-
cordingly, the Woreda level of administration gave some
political, fiscal, and administrative power to the Woreda
authorities. They also assumed a mandate to plan and
coordinate development activities at Kebele andWoreda
administration level. However, Kebeles, as the lower ech-
elon of local administration, have not experienced any
significant change.
Table 5. Response to the statement whether PSNP is a political tool of Government. Source: Survey data (2011/2012).
Indicators Household ratings (%)
Mean SD DK SD DA UD AG SA Total
The PSNP is politically tied 2.81 1.36 49(9.5) 25(4.8) 128(24.7) 128(24.7) 149(28.1) 39(7.5) 518(100)
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
Table 6. Respondents’ view about PSNP connection to political motives based on beneficiary Kebeles. Source: Survey data
(2011/2012).
Indicators The PSNP is tied to political agenda
DK SD DA UD AG SA Total
Kebele Dawa %(N) 0(0) 5.8(4) 10.1(7) 14.5(10) 37.7(26) 31.9(22) 100%(69)
Azo Gule %(N) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 32.9(23) 52.9(37) 14.3(10) 100(70)
AlyuAmbaZuria %(N) 0(0) 13.9(10) 52.8(38) 29.2(21) 4.2(3) 0(0) 100(72)
Notes: DK= don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
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The skills, knowledge and experiences of the Ke-
bele administrations are inadequate in terms of organisa-
tional and institutional capacities, nor are they entitled to
exercising any significant political, fiscal and administra-
tive power. They simply serve as agents of district author-
ities. They are neither budgeted nor allowed to generate
any local finances. Their role in local development activ-
ities and poverty reduction, therefore, is limited institu-
tionally. In this study, three indicators were used to ex-
amine the role of Kebeles in local development activities,
delivery of services to the local people and poverty reduc-
tion efforts. Based on the indicators DSR, LCP and ELGS as
elucidated in this study, the role and performance of the
Kebeles seem to be unsatisfactory.
DSR was not implemented at the Kebele level, and
the findings indicate that the Kebeles lack the capacity
and resources to deliver development. A system of up-
ward accountability of the local officials to Woreda was
established rather than downwards to the local people.
The LCP is weak at Kebele level because of weak organi-
sational capacity and institutional constraints related to
DSR. The ELGS is poor since Kebeles did not assume any
fiscal right and administrative power for the reasons as-
sociated with DSR and LCP.
The government enacted three major policy strate-
gies to address rural poverty. These are: a) enhancing
agricultural productivity through improved technology,
b) developing resilience to vulnerability and food inse-
curity through PSNPs, which aim to build assets and c)
improve livelihoods of vulnerable households, and re-
settlement of farmers from drought-prone areas to fer-
tile but less inhabitable locations in selected lowland ar-
eas of the country. However, all these efforts are coordi-
nated and managed by the Woreda administration. For
example, two major poverty alleviation programmes op-
erate at Kebele level, these being the PSNP and FTC. The
first programme aims to support food-insecure and vul-
nerable households and the second is intended to in-
crease the productivity of local households through the
application of improved inputs for agricultural produc-
tion via training and field demonstrations. However, as
noted in this article, neither programme is fully func-
tional because of lack of resources and power. There-
fore, the absence of effective decentralised governance
practice at local level in fact gravely constrains the per-
formance of poverty reduction efforts and curtail local
development initiatives.
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